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Abstract 
Stepping stone attacks are often used by network 
intruders to hide their identities. To detect and block 
stepping stone attacks, a stepping stone detection scheme 
should be able to correctly identify a stepping-stone in a 
very short time and in real-time. However, the majority 
of past research has failed to indicate how long or how 
many packets it takes for the monitor to detect a stepping 
stone. In this paper, we propose a novel quick-response 
real-time stepping stones detection scheme which is 
based on packet delay properties. Our experiments show 
that it can identify a stepping stone within 20 seconds 
which includes false positives and false negatives of less 
than 3%. 
1. Introduction 
Internet attacks have increased significantly. One of 
the most important reasons for this is the ability of 
attackers to easily hide their identities and evade 
punishment by relaying their attacks through stepping 
stones. Through using this technique, an attacker is able 
to construct a chain of interactive connections on a series 
of compromised hosts (stepping stones) using protocols 
such as Telnet or SSH. The attacker’s commands on their 
local machine are relayed via the chain of stepping stones 
until they finally reach the victim. Because the final 
victim only sees traffic from the last hop of the chain of 
the stepping stones, it is difficult for the victim to learn of 
any information about the true origin of the attack. 
However it is possible to observe a certain correlation 
between the interactive connections in the chain of the 
stepping stones, such as the identical payload or similar 
packet timings. Therefore, one can detect stepping stones 
in a network by searching for such correlations between 
interactive connections at the network borders or routers. 
If a pair of interactive connections is detected as part of a 
steppingstone chain, they can be blocked immediately to 
stop the attack, thereby preventing further harm. Or, one 
can compile them to possibly trace-back stepping stone 
paths and identify the source of an attack. 
To detect and block ongoing attacks, a stepping stone 
detection approach should be able to correctly, and 
quickly identify correlated interactive connections in 
real-time, because many attackers launch their attacks in 
a very short period of time to evade detection. It also 
means the quicker the response, the less harm that will be 
done. To trace-back and identify the source of an attack, 
real-time and quick-response is also necessary because 
attackers may have many techniques (such as fake IP 
addresses) to deny their attacking activity without spot 
evidence. Besides being responsive, a real-time stepping-
stone detection approach should be robust enough to 
resist any network imperfections (such as packet merges, 
packet drops, packet retransmissions) as well. 
Since the problem of detecting stepping stones was 
first discovered by Staniford-Chen and Heberlein [1], 
many approaches have been suggested to detect stepping 
stones in encrypted traffic. However, some previous 
approaches can not be used in real-time. For those 
stepping stone detection approaches that can be used in 
real time, only a few indicate how long or how many 
packets it takes for the monitor to detect a stepping stone. 
The Inter Packet Delay (IPD) approach [4] proposed by 
Wang et al. is the only one which takes responsiveness 
into consideration. Wang et al. claim their IPD approach 
only requires a few dozen packets (still nearly 100 
seconds or more) for correlation. Their approach is not so 
resistant to network imperfections, such as packet merges, 
packet drops and packet retransmissions which may 
change the IPD characteristics. Blum et al. [6] claim that 
their Packet Number Difference (PDN) based approach 
for stepping-stone detection can achieve provable upper 
bounds on the number of packets required to be 
monitored. However, the upper bound of the number of 
packets required is large, and therefore, quick detection 
of stepping stones remains a challenge. 
Current stepping stone detection approaches can be 
classified into three types: timing based [2, 3, 4], packet 
number based [5, 6] and Round Trip Time (RTT) based 
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[7, 8]. Unlike other types of approaches that use only 
Send packets, RTT based approaches use Send and Echo 
packets together in order to detect stepping stones. As a 
result, RTT based approaches can filter unsymmetrical 
Internet packets and chaff packets, and can be more 
resistant to network imperfections than any other type of 
approach. Yang et al. [8] proposed a Step Function 
approach to detect stepping stones, using the feature of 
RTT that changes small for normal connections but 
increases proportionally with the number of stepping-
stones in the chain. It has high accuracy of detecting a 
stepping stone when used together with Estimation-
Based RTT getting Algorithm (EBA) [10]. However this 
Step function approach must monitor packets throughout 
all connections. 
In this paper we propose a RTT based real-time 
stepping detection algorithm which needs just a small 
number of packets to be monitored and can also resist 
network imperfections. It uses the packet delay property 
with zero being the mean difference of the packet delay 
between two nodes in two directions. The results of the 
experiments and the simulations we conducted showed 
that this method can achieve a detection result within 20 
seconds. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In 
section 2 we give definitions and properties. We show 
the scheme in section 3 and some experimental results 
are given in section 4. Finally we summarize this paper in 
section 5. 
2. Definitions and properties for packet 
delay  
In this section we begin by defining some terms, and 
then present some properties for packet delay. 
2.1. Definitions of packet delay 
Because the data sent is normally echoed back for 
interactive connections, we give the definition of Round 
Trip Time (RTT) for interactive connections as follows. 
Definition 1 (RTT) The packets sent in interactive 
connections from attacker (client) to target (server) are 
called Send packets; and the packets sent in the reverse 
direction are called Echo packets. The time delay 
between the Send packet and the corresponding Echo 
packet on connection a is called Round-Trip Time (RTT) 
for interactive connection a. 
See Figure 1 for an illustration of the above definition. 
The attacker established a connection chain to the target 
machine by a series of stepping stones. Commands typed 
by the attacker are relayed to the target by a series of 
stepping stones, executed on target and then echoed back 
to the attacker by a series of stepping stones. The Round-
Trip Time (RTT) for connection a is the time delay of 
send command (packet) and the corresponding echoed 
back command (packet) on connection a. 
 
Figure 1.  Stepping stone chain between attacker and 
target. 
It is not easy to get the RTT in real-time with a high 
degree of precision because Echo packets have no 
obvious characteristic to identify correlated Send packets. 
However, there are several real-time RTT getting 
algorithms [8, 10]. We can directly use them to get the 
RTT sequence in real-time. 
Definition 2 (RTT sequence Rtta) A RTT sequence 
Rtta is a series of RTTs in chronological order obtained 
by RTT getting algorithm on connection i. Let Rtta = 
(Rtta(ta
0
), Rtta(ta
1
), …Rtta(ta
n
),  ….), where Rtta(ta
n
) (n ≥ 1) 
is the nth RTT got by RTT getting algorithm for 
interactive connection a. ta
n
 is the arrival epoch of Echo 
packet by which to get the nth RTT on connection a. 
Definition 3 (Upstream and Downstream 
Connection) We say that connection a is an upstream 
connection of connection b, and b is a downstream 
connection of a when a and b are in the same connection 
chain, and Rtta > Rttb around the same time. 
Because the upstream connections have more relay 
nodes than their downstream connections, for relayed 
same Send packet, the RTT for upstream connections is 
larger than the RTT for their downstream. 
2.2. Properties of packet delay 
Theorem 1. Let interactive connections a and b be in 
the same connection chain, connection a is the upstream 
connection of connection b, and Rtta(ta
n
) and Rttb(tb
m
) are 
the RTTs got for connections a and b separately by the 
same original Send packet. Then E [Rtta(ta
n
) – Rttb(tb
m
) – 
2(ta
n
 – tb
m
)] = 0, if the routes of Send packet are same 
with the corresponding Echo packets. 
Proof. The packet delay consists of four components, 
including processing delay, queuing delay, transmission 
delay and propagation delay [11]. Given a packet of size 
p that traverses a path of h hops, each link of capacity Ci 
and propagation delay δi, the propagation and 
transmission delay can be written as: 
Tpropagation = 
1
h
i
i
δ
=
∑  
Attacker Stepping 
stone 1 
Stepping 
stone i-1 
Stepping 
stone i 
Target 
Send 
Echo 
RTT 
a 
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Ttransmission = 
1
h
i i
p
C
=
∑  
Applying Kleinrock independence approximation, 
each link can be modeled as an M/M/1 queue [11]. The 
average number of packets in a queue can be written as: 
N = 
1
h
i
i i i
λ
µ λ
=
−
∑   (where iλ , iµ  is the arrival rate and 
service rate for every link separately) 
Apply Little’s Law, the average queuing delay per 
packet can be written as: 
Tqueuing = 
1
1 h i
i i i
λ
γ µ λ
=
−
∑   (whereγ is the total arrival 
rate). 
Ignoring the processing delay, the average packet 
delay on a path can be written as: 
T = Tpropagation + Ttransmission + Tqueuing  
    = 
1
h
i
i
δ
=
∑  + 
1
h
i i
p
C
=
∑  + 
1
1 h i
i i i
λ
γ µ λ
=
−
∑             (1) 
Let the Send packet time delay from connection a to b 
be Tab, and the Echo packet time delay from connection b 
to a be Tba. If the routes of Send packet are same with the 
corresponding Echo packets, the links from connection a 
to connection b should be the same with the links from b 
to a. So every parameter on Tab including i
δ
, i
C
, i
λ
, 
iµ , are same with  every parameters on Tba. And the size 
of Send packet and corresponding Echo packet are the 
same as well. So we can achieve 
Tab = Tba 
E(Tab ) = E(Tba) 
i.e. E(Tab ) - E(Tba) = 0                                      (2) 
Let the RTT from connection a to connection b be 
RTTab. And RTTab = Tab + Tba. By the definition we can 
get: 
RTTab = Rtta(ta
n
) – Rttb(tb
m
) 
Tba = ta
n
 – tb
m
                                                     (3) 
Tab = Rtta(ta
n
) – Rttb(tb
m
) – ( ta
n
 – tb
m
)                (4) 
Then by (2) ,(3) and (4) we can get  
E(Tab ) - E(Tba) = E(Rtta(ta
n
) – Rttb(tb
m
) – 2( ta
n
 – tb
m
)) 
= 0 
Because the route of Internet normally follows the 
shortest path rules, the routes of Send packet are 
normally the same with the corresponding Echo packets. 
Theorem 2. Let Rtta = (Rtta(ta
0
), 
Rtta(ta
1
), …Rtta(ta
n
),  ….) be the RTT sequence for 
connection a, and Rttb  = (Rttb(tb
0
), 
Rttb(tb
1
), …Rttb(tb
m
),  ….) be the RTT sequence for 
connection b. And suppose packet relay by stepping 
stones is one-to-one. Rtta and Rttb are correlated 
connections in the same connection chain if there exists n 
and m such that P(|Rtta(ta
n
) – Rttb(tb
m
) – 2(ta
n
 – tb
m
)|<θ ) 
>75%, where θ  > 2*( standard deviation of |Tab - Tba| ) 
 
Proof. According to Chebyshev inequality (Kao, 1996; 
Feller, 1968) and theorem2 
P(|Rtta(ta
n
) – Rttb(tb
m
) – 2(ta
n
 – tb
m
)|<θ ) 
=  P(|Tab  - Tba – E(Tab  - Tba)| <θ  ) 
> 1 - 
2ab bastandard deviation of |T  - T | ( )
θ
 
                                  = 75% 
3. Bidirectional Delay Comparison scheme 
for Stepping Stone detection 
Based on the Theorem 2, we designed the 
Bidirectional Delay Comparison scheme (BDC) for 
stepping stone detection. To begin with, we will describe 
the frame of our scheme and then introduce related RTT 
getting algorithms and provide details of the 
Bidirectional Delay Comparison algorithm.  
3.1. Frame of Bidirectional Delay Comparison 
scheme 
Our Bidirectional Delay Comparison scheme is 
designed to be run at the network gateway node or as an 
independent process at the stepping-stone hosts. It 
examines the interactive connections and demonstrates 
that if a connections pair is correlated connections in a 
connection chain  
To be run in real-time, we designed a RTT pool which 
is composed of RTT sequence queues for different 
interactive connections as shown in Figure 2. Initially, 
the suspected interactive connection traffic is analyzed by 
the RTT getting algorithm which outputs the RTTs to the 
RTT sequence queues in the RTT pool in real-time. The 
Bidirectional Delay Comparison algorithm will get a pair 
of RTT sequences from the RTT pool, and then give the 
results if the pair of connections are related stepping 
stones links.  
 
Figure 2. Frame of Bidirectional Delay Comparison 
scheme. 
3.2. RTT getting algorithm 
Since the RTT getting algorithm is closely related to 
our BDC scheme, we have to look at the current real-time 
RTT 
getting 
algorithm 
 Rtt1  
Rtt2 
Rttn 
Bidirectio
nal Delay 
Comparis
on 
algorithm 
Connection 1 
Connection 2 
Connection n 
R
T
T
 P
O
O
L
 
Result 
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RTT getting algorithms which output RTTs in real-time 
by analyzing the interactive connections traffic.  
Yang et al. [8] proposed Conservative and Greedy 
algorithms which can obtain RTT by matching Send 
packets and Echo packets logically. But they are based 
on the assumption that every Send packet matches one 
Echo packet. However there are packet merges, packet 
drops, packet retransmissions etc. in real internet traffic, 
which means the packet mapping information has no 
organization. Therefore, Conservative and Greedy 
algorithms have a low accuracy in getting RTT.  
Estimation-Based RTT getting Algorithm (EBA) [10] 
proposed by Li et al., calculates RTT estimation value 
first by the first-order linear recursive filter, which is 
motivated from the current TCP RTT estimation 
mechanism. It then finds the corresponding Echo packet 
whose real RTT is closest to the RTT estimating values. 
This means it is not dependent on the packet mapping 
information. Packets merge, drop, or retransmit, the 
chaff-perturbation can change the packets orderliness 
(mapping information), but cannot change the RTT 
properties that the occurrences of RTT for a connection 
chain are more like Poisson distribution [9]. So the 
accuracy of EBA algorithm can’t be affected by network 
imperfection and chaff-perturbation. The probability 
analysis in EBA showed that EBA can have the same 
accuracy with SDBA [9] which is an offline RTT getting 
algorithm and has an accuracy rate higher than 97% in 
experiments. This means that we prefer to use the EBA 
algorithm to get RTTs in real-time.  
3.3. Bidirectional Delay Comparison algorithm 
The Bidirectional Delay Comparison algorithm is 
responsible for the output of the result if two connections 
are related stepping stones. These can be gotten through 
comparison of corresponding RTT sequences.  
To be run efficiently, our BDC algorithm will do pre-
processing prior to comparing. The pre-processing 
activities include the start comparing points finding and 
upstream connection judging.  The start comparing points 
are two elements in the two separate RTT sequences. If 
two connections are related stepping stones links, RTTs 
got from the two connections should occur around the 
same time. As a result we selected the start comparing 
points where the interval of the two points was smaller 
than the value of the bigger RTT of the two points. If the 
start comparing points can not be found even with 
enough data, then the points shouldn’t be stepping stone 
links. We also needed to judge which connection was 
going to be the upstream link if there are stepping stones 
links by comparing the value of RTT of the start 
comparing points. According to definition 3, the one with 
the bigger RTT value will be the upstream connection.  
 
Table 1.  Bidirectional Delay Comparison (BDC) 
algorithm. 
Let the upstream connections’ RTT sequence from the 
start comparing point be Rtta, and the downstream 
connections’ RTT sequence from the start comparing 
point be Rttb. Then we can start to compare Rtta and Rttb. 
Firstly, we get comparing pair Rtta(ta), Rttb(tb) from Rtta 
and Rttb separately. At the beginning of the algorithm, 
Rtta(ta), Rttb(tb) is the first element in Rtta and Rttb 
separately. Next comparing pair will be got by the 
comparing result. If | Rtta(ta) - Rttb(tb) – 2(ta – tb)|< θ , we 
consider the two elements as a stepping stones pair, and 
then get next elements from Rtta and Rttb separately as 
get next elements from Rtta and Rttb separately. 
Otherwise, we do not consider the two elements as a 
stepping stone pair. However one of them may be a 
BDC(Rtta(ta), Rttb(tb),θ , k) : 
num_a = 0 ; num_b = 0 ; rate = 0 ; 
while (num_a < k || num_b< k ) 
if ta< tb 
Rtta(ta) = get next from Rtta queue; num_a++; 
    else 
Tba = ta – tb; 
        Tab = Rtta (ta) – Rttb(tb) - delay_ba; 
if Tab < 0 
Rttb(tb) = get next from Rttb queue;
 num_b++; 
else if Tba > Tab 
   if Tba – Tab <θ  
Rtta(ta) = get next from Rtta queue;  
Rttb(tb) = get next from Rttb queue;  
num_a++; num_b++; rate++; 
else Rttb(tb) = get next from Rttb queue; 
num_b++; 
     end 
else if  Tab - Tba <θ   
 Rtta(ta) = get next from Rtta queue; 
num_a++; 
 Rttb(tb) = get next from Rttb 
queue;num_b++; rate++; 
else Rtta(ta) = get next from Rtta queue;  
num_a++; 
end 
end 
end 
rate = rate/k; 
if rate > 75% 
return STEPPING_STONE; 
else if rate < 25% 
return NON_STEPPING_STONE; 
else  
return NOT_SURE; 
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stepping stone pair with another element. So we select 
next comparing pair according to the value of Tab (the 
time delay of Send packet from connection a to b) and 
Tba (the time delay of Echo packet from connection b to 
a). If Tab is larger than Tba, the comparing pair should be 
current Rtta element with the next Rttb element. 
Otherwise, the comparing pair should be current Rttb 
element with next Rtta element. Then we repeat above 
comparing procedure until every RTT sequence has at 
least k number of elements being compared.  
We then calculated the checking rate as the times 
being judged stepping stones pair divides k. If the 
checking rate is higher then 75%, we consider the two 
connections as stepping stone links according to Theorem 
2. If the checking rate is lower than 25%, we do not 
consider the two connections as stepping stone links. 
Otherwise, further comparisons would need to be made.  
The BDC algorithm is presented in Table 1. 
3.4. Parameters Discussion 
There are two parameters in our scheme: k and θ .  k 
is the number of RTTs we should compare before the 
result is returned. The smaller the k, the quicker the 
response will be. But the bigger the k, the lower the 
accuracy will be. θ  should be bigger than 2*( standard 
deviation of |Tab - Tba| as described in Theorem 2. In 
addition, we knew that RTTab = Tab + Tab, and the 
standard deviation of |Tab - Tba| should not be bigger than 
the standard deviation of RTTab. So we let θ  > 
2*(standard deviation of RTTab). In our experiments, θ  
was set to 30 microseconds and k was set to 10, which 
worked well.  
4. Experiments 
In this section, we demonstrate the responsiveness and 
accuracy of the BDC scheme using experiments. 
Figure 3.  Experiment topology. 
We built two connection chains on Internet by SSH 
from host H1 and host H2 separately, with both passing 
through host H3, then to hosts H4, H5, H6, and finally 
connecting to host H7. And H4 and H6 are in same 
network segment, as shown on Figure 3. The other hosts 
located in different area of Melbourne. We captured the 
SSH packets and applied EBA and BDC algorithms 
concurrently at host H4 when all the connection chains 
were built. Let SSH connections between H3 and H4, H4 
and H5, H5 and H6 and H6 to H7 started by H1 as 
connection a1, b1, c1 and d1 (these are correlated 
connections). Similarly, the connections in another 
connection chain started by H2 are supposed to be a2, b2, 
c2and d2, which are also correlated connections. Since 
H4 and H6 are in the same network segment, we have 
eight connections’ packet data by capturing data at H4. 
After the two connection chains have been built, we 
entered commands at the terminal of H1 and H2 by quick 
speed concurrently for about 3 minutes. Then we checked 
if our BDC algorithm could identify correlated 
connections and uncorrelated connections quickly. To 
give comparable results, we let the EBA algorithm output 
the RTT sequence continuously even if the BDC had 
output the detection results.  
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Figure 4.  a1 and d1 are correlated stepping stone 
connections. 
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Figure 5.  a1 and d2 are uncorrelated stepping stone 
connections. 
Our experiments showed that the BDC scheme output 
the detection results for every connection pair correctly 
within 20 seconds. Two sample results as shown in 
Figure 4 and Figure 5, with the X-axis representing the 
H1 H2 
H3 
H4 
H5 
H6 
H7 
a1 b1 c1 
d1 
a2 b2 c2 
d2 
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time in unit of s since connections were monitored. The 
Y-axis represents RTT values in a unit of ms, and the red 
line represents the point when the BDC scheme outputs 
the detection results. Figure 4 shows that the BDC 
scheme found that a1 and d1 are correlated stepping 
stone connections in 9 seconds. Figure 5 shows that the 
BDC scheme found that a1 and d2 are uncorrelated 
stepping stone connections in 13 seconds. 
To estimate the accuracy of the BDC scheme, we then 
ran EBA and BDC algorithm continually off-line which 
means it will continually give the judging result with 
every k RTT. We then combined all the results, with a 
total of 133 judging results for stepping stones pairs. 
Only 4 of them had been judged a non-stepping stone 
pair, which means the false negative (stepping-stone 
connections erroneously flagged as non-stepping stones 
connections) rate is 3%. In total, there are 157 judging 
results for non-stepping stones pairs, and only 1 of them 
had been judged a non-stepping stone pair. This means a 
false positive (non-stepping-stone connections 
erroneously flagged as stepping stones connections) rate 
is 0.6% as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2.  False negative and false positive 
 The 
total 
judging 
results 
Times been 
judged 
erroneously 
False 
positive 
False 
negative 
Stepping 
stones 
133 4  3.0% 
Non 
stepping 
stones 
157 1 0.6%  
5. Conclusion 
Quick responsiveness is still a challenge for tracing 
back or blocking stepping stone attacks. In this paper, we 
propose a novel quick-response real-time stepping stones 
detection scheme which is based on packet delay 
properties with the mean difference of the packet delay 
between two nodes in two directions equaling zero. The 
results of the experiments and the simulations we 
conducted showed that this method can achieve detection 
results within 20 seconds. This is quicker than the IPD 
approach which was the only approach taking 
responsiveness into consideration. Our experiments also 
demonstrate that false positives and false negatives are 
no more than 3% which indicates it can be resistant to 
normal network imperfection as well. 
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